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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the 
above-entitled Court by §78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is it reversible error for the prosecution to fail to 
provide discovery or for the court to refuse to compel discovery? 
a» Should the prosecution have been ordered to provide 
discovery regarding St. George police policies and procedures 
regarding hot pursuit? 
b. Should the prosecution have been ordered to provide 
discovery regarding their rebuttal witness? 
2. Was the Appellant prejudiced unfairly by having a defense 
witness appear before the jury in shackles and prison clothes? 
3. Was the Appellant prejudiced by the court ordering a 
witness transported prior to being called as a defense witness? 
4. was the Appellant entitled to being convicted of lesser 
included offenses only? 
a Is the offense of failure to pay drug stamp tax a 
lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute? 
b Is the offense of reckless driving a lesser 
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant 
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included offense of failure to respond to an officer's signal to 
stop? 
5. Was there sufficient evidence given to the jury for the 
return of a conviction of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute? 
6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing 
appellant to consecutive sentences without the benefit of a 
presentence report? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I A & B: The standard of review is whether the 
discovery error by the State resulted in a resonable likelihood 
of a more favorable result for the Appellant. State v. Fontana, 
680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984), cited in Salt Lake City v. 
Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 1993). 
POINT II and III: Standard of review is to review the 
record evidence and determine from a totality of the 
circumstances whether the ruling is consistent with the 
guarantees of due process. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 264, (Utah 
1991) . 
POINT IV A & B: The question of an improper 
conviction (multiple sentences rather than lesser included 
offenses) is that of plain error, requiring a finding that (i) an 
error occurred, (ii) the error was obvious, and (iii) the error 
was harmful. State v. Brooks (Brooks II), 908 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant 
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1995). See also State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 
1994)(citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
POINT V: The appellate Court is limited on a question 
of sufficiency of the evidence to the question of whether the 
jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants 
were guilty. See State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 at 218,(Utah 
1976), citing State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P.2d 805 (1942). 
POINT VI: State v. Stettina, 868 P.2d 108 at 109, 
(Utah App. 1994) sets out the standard of review for a question 
of an illegal sentence: it is a question of law, and questions of 
law are reviewed for correctness. See also State v. Souza, 846 
P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah App.1993). 
PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD 
POINT I A: Counsel made a Motion to Compel regarding 
the policies and procedures of the St. George City Police, which 
was denied by the trial court. A record was made for 
preservation on appeal. See generally Addendum to Appellant's 
Brief. 
POINT I B: When the State called Kassie McArthur as a 
rebuttal witness (R., p. 680, 1. 25 - p. 681, 1. 1), the defense 
objected on the grounds of surprise and the State's failure to 
provide discovery {R., p. 681, LI.9-13). The objection was 
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant 
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overruled {R., p. 681, LI. 17-19). 
POINT II: On the first day of trial and during the 
State's case in chief, the Court requested that a defense 
witness, Kim Randall, be called to testify out of turn and during 
the State's case in chief (R., p. 457, 1. 24 - p. 458, 1. 9). 
That was done and when Kim Randall was brought into the courtroom 
after a brief recess, he was in shackles and an orange prisoner's 
uniform (R., p. 460, LI. 8-13). The jury had not seen Mr. 
Randall at that point. Defense counsel, on the record, objected 
to Mr. Randall appearing before the jury so dressed and in 
shackles (R., p. 460, LI. 3-7). The Court overruled the 
objection (R., p. 461, 1. 20 - p. 462, 1. 8) and Mr. Randall 
testified before the jury in shackles and prisoner's clothes [R., 
p. 463 - p. 482). 
POINT III: The defense witness, Kim Randall, was 
brought to the trial from the Kane County Jail pursuant to a 
Transportation Order signed by the Trial Judge herein prior to 
the commencement of trial (R., p. 114-115). That Order provided 
that Mr. Randall would be held at the Washington County Jail 
until the conclusion of trial {Id., p. 115). At the conclusion 
of Mr. Randall's testimony on February 5, 1996, he was not 
excused by the Court (J?., p. 482). On the second day of trial, 
February 8, 1996, the defense called Mr. Randall to testify 
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during the Appellant's case in chief and was informed that Mr. 
Randall had been returned to Kane County (R., p. 677, LI. 12-18). 
The Court denied Appellant's request to call Kim Randall to 
testify in the Appellant's case in chief, and required defense 
counsel to give a proffer of Mr. Randall's proposed testimony 
(R., p. 678, LI. 6-10). The defense moved, on the record, for a 
mistrial and that motion was denied (R., p. 679, 1. 24 - p. 680, 
1. 5) . 
POINT IV A, B: Plain error may be reviewed by the 
Appellate court when raised for the first time on appeal. See 
State v. Brooks (Brooks II), 908 P.2d 856 at 861. 
POINT V: Sufficiency of evidence may be reviewed for 
the first time on appeal. State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 at 
218,(Utah 1976), citing State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P.2d 805 
(1942). 
POINT VI: An improper or illegal sentence may be 
raised at any time. See State v. Brooks (Brooks II), supra at 
860. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16(5) (b) : 
The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon 
as practicable following the filing of charges and 
before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make 
disclosure. 
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant 
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Utah Code Annotated §76-3-401 (1), (3) : 
(1) A Court shall determine, if a defendant has been 
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, 
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state 
offenses shall run concurrently unless the Court 
states in the sentence that they shall run 
consecutively. 
* * * * * 
(3) A court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant 
in determining whether to impose consecutive 
sentences. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant/Defendant (hereinafter "Appellant") was charged 
by Information with the following charges: Count I: POSSESSION 
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a second 
degree felony; Count II: TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE, a second degree 
felony; Count III: FAILURE TO PAY DRUG STAMP TAX, a third degree 
felony; COUNT IV: FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP, 
a third degree felony; Count V: POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHENALIA, 
a class B misdemeanor; and Count VI: RECKLESS DRIVING, a class B 
misdemeanor. 
The charges were taken to a jury trial before the Hon. 
James L. Shumate. After a two-day jury trial, Appellant was 
found guilty of all charges. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The police alleged that on May 16, 1995, the Appellant 
was operating a motorcycle, east bound on St. George Boulevard 
when officer Stoker observed a tail light assembly on the 
motorcycle dangling down on the same (Record, page 327, lines 1-
6); the officer turned on the motorcycle, observed the motorcycle 
turn left onto 1-15 without signaling (R., p. 327, LI. 8-12), at 
which time the officer engaged in a high speed chase of the 
motorcycle south on 1-15. R., p. 328, LI 7-11. According to the 
officer, the Appellant was throwing objects during the chase (R., 
p. 329, 1. 13 - p. 331, 1. 14). Officer Stoker testified that 
the chase ended at the South St. George 1-15 off-ramp where the 
Appellant's motorcycle ran into the a backup officer's patrol car 
(R., p. 333, LI. 2-8). The Appellant was then arrested. 
Officer Stoker testified that after the arrest he and 
several other law enforcement officers went back to the freeway 
to search for the items he had seen thrown by the Appellant(R., 
p. 343, LI. 1-11). He found several pieces of hypodermic 
syringes {R., p. 343, LI. 19-24), and later found a small plastic 
bag with a white powdery substance inside of it (R., p. 346, LI. 
2-10) which did not have a drug stamp affixed to it (R., p. 353, 
LI. 6-11). Jon Gerlitz from the State Crime Lab, in his 
testimony, identified the substance in the plastic bag as being 
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant 
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26.3 grams of methamphetamine (R, p. 451, LI. 10-12). 
During the proceedings herein the Appellant filed a 
Motion to Discover (R. , pp. 8-10) and later filed a Motion to 
Compel and pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the Appellant sought an order from the Court 
compelling the prosecution to provide Appellant with a copy of 
the St. George City Police Department's written Policies and 
Procedure regarding police officer's "fresh or hot pursuit." At 
a hearing held on the Motion on September 27, 1995, the Trial 
Judge denied Appellant's Motion to Compel from the bench. 
Apparently no written order was ever filed.1 
This case was tried by jury and the trial started on 
February 5, 1996. On the first day of trial and during the 
State's case in chief, the Court requested that a defense 
witness, Kim Randall, be called to testify out of turn and during 
the State's case in chief (R., p. 457, 1. 24 - p. 458, 1. 9). 
That was done and when Kim Randall was brought into the courtroom 
after a brief recess, he was in shackles and an orange prisoner's 
uniform (R., p. 460, LI. 8-13). The jury had not seen Mr. 
Randall at that point. Defense counsel objected to Mr. Randall 
Htfhile there is nothing in the Court's Record to indicate a 
written Motion to Compel or a formal written Order regarding this 
matter, Appellant has obtained a certified transcript of the 
hearing in which the Motion to Compel was ruled upon, and 
includes the transcript as part of his Addendum to his Brief. 
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appearing before the jury so dressed and in shackles (R., p. 460, 
LI. 3-7). The Court overruled the objection (R., p. 461, 1. 20 -
p. 462, 1. 8) and Mr. Randall testified before the jury in 
shackles and prisoner's clothes (R., p. 463 - p. 482). 
The defense witness, Kim Randall, was brought to the 
trial from the Kane County Jail pursuant to a Transportation 
Order signed by the Trial Judge herein prior to the commencement 
of trial (R. , p. 114-115). That Order provided that Mr. Randall 
would be held at the Washington County Jail until the conclusion 
of trial {Id., p. 115). At the conclusion of Mr. Randall's 
testimony on February 5, 1996, he was not excused by the Court 
(R. , p. 482). On the second day of trial, February 8, 1996, the 
defense called Mr. Randall to testify during the Appellant's case 
in chief and was informed that Mr. Randall had been returned to 
Kane County (R., p. 677, LI. 12-18). The Court denied 
Appellant's request to call Kim Randall to testify in the 
Appellant's case in chief, and required defense counsel to give a 
proffer of Mr. Randall's proposed testimony (R., p. 678, LI. 6-
10) . The defense moved for a mistrial and that motion was deniec 
{R., p. 679, 1. 24 - p. 680, 1. 5). 
The State called Kassie McArthur as a rebuttal witness 
(R., p. 680, 1. 25 - p. 681, 1. 1). The defense objected on the 
grounds of surprise and the State's failure to provide discovery 
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant 
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(J?., p. 681, LI. 9-13). The objection was overruled [R., p. 681, 
LI. 17-19). Months prior to trial the defense had, through its 
discovery motion, requested a list of witnesses that the State 
intended to call to testify at trial (R., p. 9, M 4, 6). The 
State had not listed Kassie McArthur on any witness list provided 
to the defense. The State brought Kassi McArthur from the Utah 
State prison to testify at the trial herein pursuant to an ex 
parte motion for transportation order dated January 25, 1996 (JR., 
p. 106), with said order dated January 30, 1996 (R., p. 107). 
The trial started February 5, 1996 (Id.) 
The Appellant was found guilty of all counts by the jury 
[R., p. 759, 1. 10 - p. 760, 1. 9). The Appellant chose to waive 
the time for sentencing (R., p. 762, LI. 20-24), and the Court 
sentenced the Appellant to two consecutive terms of imprisonment 
of not less than one year and not more than fifteen years. The 
Appellant was also sentenced to serve two concurrent zero to five 
year terms and two concurrent County jail terms of six months 
with the balance of the two six month terms being suspended (R., 
p. 769, 1. 20-p. 772, 1. 10). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I, A: The Appellant requested two pieces of 
information from the State which were not in totality provided. 
First, Appellant informally requested from the State a copy of 
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant 
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the policies and procedures of St. George City Police regarding 
high speed chases. This request was denied by the State, and the 
Appellant brought the issue to the Court, which denied the 
motion. Was this denial of Appellant's Motion to Compel 
improper? 
POINT I, B: The State called a witness at trial as a 
rebuttal witness, and gave no advance notice to Appellant that 
this witness would be called. Appellant had requested a list of 
the State's witnesses in his Motion for Discovery, and the State 
filed an ex parte transporation order with the Court more than a 
week prior to trial requesting this witness for the trial. Did 
the State violate their continuing duty to disclose discovery 
under Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? Did the Court 
improperly deny Appellant's Motion for Mistrial? Did the Court 
fail to take measures that would have lessened the impact of the 
unexpected testimony on the Defendant? 
POINT II: One of Appellant's witnesses, one Kim Randall, 
was in the custody of the Kane County Sheriff's Department, and 
testified in shackles and in a prisoner's uniform. Appellant had 
brought street clothes for Randall to dress in, and there was no 
concern discussed by the Court or the State that Randall would 
pose a security risk. The judge refused to have the shackles 
removed from Randall, and would not allow Randall to wear street 
clothes. Did this improperly prejudice the Appellant? 
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant 
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POINT III: Randall was ordered to be transported to the 
Washington County Jail from the Kane County Jail for purposes of 
testifying as a witness for the Appellant. The transporation 
order called for Randall to remain in Washington County until the 
conclusion of the trial. Appellant called Randall on the first 
day of trial, and wished to recall him on the second day of 
trial. Appellant was notified that Randall had been returned to 
the Kane County Jail prior to that time. The judge would not 
allow the Appellant to present to the jury a proffer as to what 
Randall's testimony would be. Appellant counted on the 
availability of Randall until the conclusion of the trial. Did 
Randall's unavailability unfairly prejudice the Appellant? 
POINT IV: The Appellant is entited to be convicted of a 
lesser included offense if he is convicted of two offenses, one 
of which is the lesser included offense of the other. POINT IV 
A: Is the failure to pay drug stamp tax a lesser included offense 
of possession of a controlled substance with itent to distribute? 
POINT IV B: Is the offense of reckless driving a lesser included 
offense of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop? 
POINT V: The arresting officer testified that the 
Appellant threw certain items while trying to evade arrest. 
Items were later found on the well-traveled highway which the 
officer claimed were the same items that were thrown. Was there 
insufficient evidence presented by the State to tie this item of 
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant 
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evidence to the Appellant? 
POINT VI: The Appellant waived the time for sentencing, 
and the Court sentenced the Appellant to consecutive terms for 
counts I and II without the assistance of a presentence report. 
Was this sentencing to consecutive sentences without objective, 
unbiased, information provided to the Court as to the Appellant's 
history, character and rehabilitative needs an abuse of 
discretion, and a violation of the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated §76-3-401(3)? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. IS IT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE PROSECUTION TO 
FAIL TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY OR FOR THE COURT TO REFUSE TO COMPEL 
DISCOVERY? 
A. SHOULD THE PROSECUTION HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PROVIDE 
DISCOVERY REGARDING ST. GEORGE POLICE POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES REGARDING HOT PURSUIT? 
Prior to the jury trial, Appellant requested discovery of 
the State, specifically requesting the policies and procedures of 
the St. George Police Department regarding hot pursuit. The 
reason for requesting this was that the Appellant was captured 
and arrested by police after a "hot pursuit" high speed chase. 
During this pursuit, the State claims that the Appellant threw 
items off of his person, which was later collected by police to 
be used as evidence against the Appellant. Appellant requested a 
copy of the policies and procedures of the St. George Police 
Department in an effort to determine whether or not the officer 
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant 
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conducted the pursuit in conformity with those policies and 
procedures. The State refused to disclose whether there were 
such policies and procedures, and the Trial Court refused to 
compel the State to disclose said information (See, generally,, 
Addendum, p. 8, LI. 19-25). 
It is well settled that the prosecution must provide 
Appellant with discovery when requested pursuant to Rule 16, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3384, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) and 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916-917 (Utah 1987). The question 
is whether the policies and procedures of the St. George City 
Police Department would come within the scope of Rule 16. 
In the area of inventory searches of seized vehicles, the 
Utah Supreme Court made it mandatory for inventory searches to be 
conducted in conformity with standardized, specific procedures. 
State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 (Utah App. 1988), following 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 
(1987) . The reason for the need of these procedures, inter alia, 
is to preclude the possibility that officers conducting the 
searches will act arbitrarily. Shamblin, supra at 428. In much 
the same way, Appellant should have been appraised as to whether 
or not there were policies and procedures of the St. George City 
Police Department regarding high speed chases. Did policies 
governing high speed chases exist? Did the officer conform to 
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those policies and procedures? Also, was the evidence later 
gathered in conformity with those policies? These questions were 
not answered, and the Court did not compel the State to answer. 
The Appellant was prejudiced by this: if the officer did not 
follow the proper hot pursuit procedures, this would be evidence 
to impeach the officer as to whether or not he would follow 
policies and procedures at other times. And, if there were 
policies and procedures governing high speed chases, and the 
gathering of evidence during and after high speed chases, whether 
or not the St. George City Police adhered to those policies would 
have had an impact as to whether or not the evidence was gathered 
properly, and possibly should have been suppressed at trail. 
B. SHOULD THE PROSECUTION HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PROVIDE 
DISCOVERY REGARDING THEIR REBUTTAL WITNESS? 
The State called Kassie McArthur as a rebuttal witness 
(J*., p. 680, 1. 25 - p. 681, 1. 1). The defense objected on the 
grounds of surprise and the State's failure to provide discovery 
(R. , p. 681, LI.9-13). The objection was overruled (R., p. 681, 
LI. 17-19). Months prior to trial the defense had, through its 
discovery motion, requested a list of witnesses that the State 
intended to call to testify at trial (R., p. 9, If 4, 6). The 
State had not listed Kassie McArthur on any witness list provided 
to the defense. The State brought Kassi McArthur from the Utah 
State prison to testify at the trial herein pursuant to an ex 
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parte motion for transportation order dated January 25, 1996 (R., 
p. 106), with said order dated January 30, 1996 {R., p. 107). 
The trial started February 5, 1996 (Id.) 
It is clear that the State knew, well in advance of the 
trial, that they were going to call Kassie McArthur as a witness. 
Yet, until McArthur was called on day two of the jury trial, the 
defense was not on notice that she would be called. The United 
States Supreme Court recognized that the prosecutor in a criminal 
case has a duty to disclose this kind of information when 
requested: "[wjhen the prosecutor receives a specific and 
relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if 
ever, excusable." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 
S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). The Utah Supreme Court 
spelled out the duties of the criminal prosecutor as to discovery 
in State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994): 
In criminal prosecutions, the State has two 
independent obligations to provide evidence to the 
defense. First, the State has a duty under the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution to 
provide, without request by the defendant, all 
exculpatory evidence. State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 
850 (Utah 1988); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 
(Utah 1985) . Second, when required by court order, the 
State must disclose evidence pursuant to Rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The practice in this 
state, at least in some districts, is for the prosecutors 
to make all inculpatory evidence available to the defense 
on request. See Utah R.Crim.P. 16(a) (3) . 
Whether prosecutors produce inculpatory evidence 
under court order or on request, they have a duty to 
comply fully and forthrightly. In State v. Knight, 734 
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P.2d 913, 916-17 (Utah 1987), this Court held that when 
the prosecution makes a voluntary disclosure of 
inculpatory evidence to a defendant, the prosecution must 
produce all the requested material or identify those 
portions not disclosed. If evidence is disclosed, the 
prosecutor has a continuing obligation to disclose newly 
acquired information so as to avoid misleading the 
defense. 
Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143. 
The State had already responded in part to Appellant's 
discovery request; the State had disclosed to Appellant the 
witnesses who were to be called, short of McArthur. The non-
disclosure was more than just a procedural irregularity; it 
turned the trial of Appellant into a contest between the State 
and Appellant rather than being a search for truth. As the Utah 
Supreme Court remarked in State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 
1985): 
As we have several times noted, a criminal proceeding 
is more than an adversarial contest between two competing 
sides. It is a search for truth upon which a just 
judgment may be predicated. Procedural rules are 
designed to promote that objective, not frustrate it. 
When a request or an order for discovery is made pursuant 
to Sec. 77-35-16(a), a prosecutor must comply. To meet 
basic standards of fairness and to ensure that a trial is 
a real quest for truth and not simply a contest between 
the parties to win, a defendant's request for information 
which has been voluntarily complied with, or a court 
order of discovery must be deemed to be a continuing 
request. And even though there is no court-ordered 
disclosure, a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly 
discovered inculpatory information which falls with the 
ambit of Sec. 77-35-16(a), after the prosecution has made 
a voluntary disclosure of evidence might so mislead 
defendant as to cause prejudicial error. 
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Carter, 707 P.2d at 662 
In not granting the Appellant's Motion for a Mistrial, 
and in not continuing sua sponte the trial for at least some time 
to allow the defense to prepare adequately for the testimony of 
McArthur, the Appellant was denied a fair trial. 
The testimony of McArthur was extremely damaging to 
Appellant's case. McArthur testified that she had witnessed the 
pursuit between the police and Appellant (R., p. 685, LI. 19-25). 
She also testified that Appellant had asked her to tell police 
that she had not seen Appellant throwing anything, even though 
that would not be true [R., p. 686, LI. 21-24). McArthur did 
give a statement to law enforcement — a copy of which was not 
disclosed, again, to Appellant (R., p. 687, 1. 20 - p. 688, 1. 
7) . The State had McArthur read portions of the statement which 
referred to Appellant physically threatening her to make 
exculpatory statements in his behalf to police (R., p. 689, 1. 22 
- p. 691, 1. 5). 
Hence, this witness was an acquaintence of the Appellant, 
was there (or close to) at the time of the events that led to 
Appellant's arrest, and testified that, not only did he confess 
to her that he had thrown a bag of methamphetamine, but he also 
threatened her if she did not give certain testimony to law 
enforcement — itself a separate crime, that being witness 
tampering. 
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While Appellant's counsel was able to cross-examine 
McArthur regarding the statement given to law enforcement, had 
Appellant known that the State was planning on calling her as a 
witness, Appellant, along with Appellant's counsel and the 
private investigator who was working for the Appellant, could 
have assisted Appellant in preparing for McArthur's testimony. 
This certainly constitutes the kind of credible argument 
that the defense was impaired by the non-disclosures by the 
State. Let us note, it is not just the non-disclosure of 
McArthur as a witness, but the allied non-disclosure of the 
statement given by McArthur to law enforcement. The next step 
here is outlined in State v. Knight, Supra at 921: 
Therefore, when the defendant can make a credible 
argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the 
defense, it is up to the State to persuade the court that 
there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the error, 
the outcome of trial would have been more favorable for 
the defendant. 
Given the devestating nature of McArthur's testimony, it 
is highly likely that McArthur's testimony was outcome 
determinative...but may not have been had the Appellant had time 
to prepare. What happened in this case is precisely what had 
happened in Salt Lake City v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 
1993) . Like in Reynolds, this is not a case of the prosecutor 
complying fully with the discovery request. This is not a case 
of the prosecutor partially complying with the discovery request. 
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This is not a case of the prosecutor refusing to comply with the 
discovery request, and then seeking to justify that refusal. 
This is a case of the prosecutor ignoring the discovery request. 
Given that response (or lack thereof), the Appellant could 
logically assume that it did not exist; i.e., that McArthur would 
not be called as a witness. Appellant was thus denied a 
reasonable opportunity to compel disclosure of the information 
the State had in their file regarding McArthur. The testimony 
provided by McArthur was highly prejudicial. Hence, the 
conviction sould be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
POINT II. WAS THE APPELLANT PREJUDICED UNFAIRLY BY 
HAVING A DEFENSE WITNESS APPEAR BEFORE THE JURY IN SHACKLES AND 
PRISON CLOTHING? 
As noted in the facts above, Defense counsel objected to 
Mr. Randall appearing before the jury dressed in jail overalls 
and in shackles (R., p. 460, LI. 3-7). The Court overruled the 
objection {R. , p. 461, 1. 20 - p. 462, 1. 8) and Mr. Randall 
testified before the jury in shackles and prisoner's clothes (R., 
p. 463 - p. 482). 
A criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is a 
fundamental liberty secured by the fourteenth amendment. Estelle 
v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1692, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 
(1976); State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah App. 1991). 
While the right to remain without shackles, and thus retain the 
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"garb of innocence" is a right retained by the Defendant, it 
should be extended as well to witnesses for the Defendant, 
especially where non-jail clothing is provided, and there is no 
perceived security threat. For the Defendant to have a witness 
testify in shackles and jail overalls is probably the same as not 
having a witness at all. For the trial court to have allowed the 
witness to testify in such a way deprived the Appellant of a fair 
trial; the verdict should be overturned and remanded for a new 
trial. 
III. WAS THE APPELLANT PREJUDICED UNFAIRLY BY THE COURT 
ORDERING A WITNESS TRANSPORTED PRIOR TO BEING CALLED AS A DEFENSE 
WITNESS? 
Again, under an analysis of the Appellant having the 
right to a fair trial, Estelle, supra, Mitchell, supra, 
Appellant's witness was unavailable to be called, as the Court 
had returned him to the Kane County Jail prior to the conclusion 
of the trial [R., p. 677, LI. 12-18), contravening the Court's 
own transportation order (R., pp. 114-115). The Court denied 
Appellant's request to call Kim Randall to testify in the 
Appellant's case in chief, and required defense counsel to give a 
proffer of Mr. Randall's proposed testimony (R., p. 678, LI. 6-
10) . The defense moved for a mistrial and that motion was denied 
[R., p. 679, 1. 24 - p. 680, 1. 5). 
While the Court found that the testimony proffered was 
"cumulative" to what was testified the day before (Id.), Defense 
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counsel was caught off guard, and was not able to articulate the 
full range of questioning that he was planning on asking the 
witness. Further, the answers to questions on direct testimony 
could have elicited questions beyond those stated to the Court by 
counsel. 
Appellant has the burden of producing a marshalling of 
the evidence, and thus must point out that the Utah Supreme Court 
has held that "we will not set aside a verdict because of the 
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless a proffer of evidence 
appears of record, and we believe that the excluded evidence 
would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about 
a different verdict." State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 
1986). While the excluded testimony from the witness, by itself, 
may not be enough to conclude that the Appellant did not receive 
a fair trial, it should be taken in light of the other errors at 
trial, not the least of which was the rebuttal witness called as 
a surprise by the prosecution. It is unknown whether Randall 
could have provided rebuttal testimony to the testimony of 
McArthur, but the testimony of McArthur was not known until the 
day of trial, and even if Randall could have impeached her 
testimony, he was in Kane County. Based on these concerns, this 
error, in concert with all other errors discussed in Appellant's 
Brief, the cumulative impact of the inadmissible testimony and 
evidence created reversible error by tending to prejudice the 
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rights of the Appellant. "'Cumulative error' refers to a number 
of errors which prejudice [a] defendant's rights to a fair 
trial." Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987); State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 
501-02 (Utah 1986); See also State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 
282 P.2d 323 (1955); Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248 
(Okla.Crim.App.1980); State v. McKenzie, 186 Mont. 481, 608 P.2d 
428, 448, cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1050, 101 S.Ct. 626, 66 L.Ed.2d 
507 (1980). 
IV. WAS THE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO BE CONVICTED OF A 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES ONLY? 
A. IS THE OFFENSE OF FAILURE TO PAY DRUG STAMP 
TAX A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF 
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE? 
Under Utah law, a criminal defendant cannot be convicted 
of both a stated crime and a lesser crime that is necessarily 
included in the proof of the greater. See State v. Brooks 
(Brooks II), 908 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1995); State v. Bradley, 752 
P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1985)(per curiam); State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 
96, 97 (Utah 1983). A thorough analysis requires two steps: 
first, a theoretical comparison of the elements of the crimes 
claimed to be in a lesser included relationship. Brooks II, 
supra at 861. Such a theoretical comparison of the elements of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, 
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and Failure to Pay Drug Stamp Tax, is as follows: 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute (a 
second degree felony): 
1. The Defendant knowingly and intentionally 
2. Possessed a controlled substance 
3. In Washington County, State of Utah 
4. With the intent to distribute, 
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv). 
Failure to Pay Drug Stamp Tax 
1. The Defendant knowingly and intentionally 
2. In Washington County, State of Utah 
3. Possessed a controlled substance (as defined in Utah Code 
Annotated §58-37-2) 
4. And be a dealer of the controlled substance, meaning that 
the amount of the controlled substance must measure at 
least seven grams, 
5. For which he did not pay the requisite tax. 
Utah Code Annotated §§59-19-102, 104 & 105, 
In both of the statutes, it is necessary for the 
Defendant charged to possess a controlled substance. Both 
statutes also look to the quantity of controlled substances 
possessed. In the case of Possession with Intent to Distribute, 
the Courts have held that the quantity of the controlled 
substance is indicative of whether or not there was intent to 
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distribute. "Where one possesses a controlled substance in a 
quantity too large for personal consumption, the trier of fact 
can infer that the possessor had an intent to distribute. State 
v. Anderton, Utah, 668 P.2d 1258, 1262 (1983)." State v. Fox, 
709 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah 1985). The Drug Stamp Tax statute 
requires that the person possessing the controlled substance be a 
"dealer", which is statutorily defined as one having been found 
possessing over 7 grams of the controlled substance. Hence, both 
will look to the quantity of the substance to determine whether 
the law has been violated. Thus far, the evidence to support a 
conviction of Possession with Intent to Distribute necessarily 
includes evidence of Failure to Pay Drug Stamp Tax. 
The Drug Stamp Tax statute does require that the accused 
purchase a drug stamp, a requirement not found in Possession with 
Intent to Distribute. However, it is generally recognized that 
the Drug Stamp Tax act is one that is uniformly not complied 
with. Appellant is unaware of any case in which a defendant 
arrested with a sizeable quantity of a controlled substance 
actually had a drug stamp affixed to it. In every other way, a 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to distribute necessarily includes conviction of failure to pay 
drug stamp tax. Hence, Failure to Pay Drug Stamp Tax should be 
considered to be a lesser included offense of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, and the 
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Appellant's conviction for Possession of a Controlled Substance 
with Intent to Distribute should be dismissed. 
B. IS THE OFFENSE OF FAILURE TO RESPOND TO 
OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP A LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF RECKLESS DRIVING? 
The analysis here is the same as POINT IV A above. The 
elements of Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop are 
as follows: 
1. The Defendant knowingly and intentionally 
2. In Washington County, State of Utah 
3. Having received a visual signal from a peace officer to 
bring his vehicle to a stop 
4. Operates his vehicle in a willful and wanton disregard of 
the officer's signal 
5. So as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any 
vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a 
peace officer by vehicle or other means. 
Utah Code Annotated §41-6-13.5(1) 
The elements of reckless driving are: 
1. The Defendant knowingly and intentionally 
2. In Washington County, State of Utah 
3. Operated a motor vehicle in willful or wanton disregard 
for the safety of persons or property. 
Utah Code Annotated §41-6-43. 
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In the Failure to Respond statute, the element of willful 
or wanton disregard of the officer's signal to stop is akin to a 
willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or 
property, as that will be the logical outcome of such a disregard 
of the officer's signal. Hence, conviction of Failure to Respond 
necessarily includes a conviction of Reckless Driving, and the 
conviction of Failure to Respond should be overturned. 
POINT V: WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE GIVEN TO THE JURY 
FOR THE RETURN OF A CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE? 
According to Officer Stoker, the Appellant was throwing 
objects away during the high speed chase. When this happened, 
Officer Stoker was chasing the Appellant on Southbound Interstate 
15, where the highway by and over various streets in St. George 
(JR., p. 329, 1. 13 - p. 331, 1. 14). Officer Stoker testified 
that the chase ended at the South St. George 1-15 off-ramp where 
the Appellant's motorcycle ran into the a backup officer's patrol 
car (R., p. 333, LI. 2-8). The Appellant was then arrested. 
Officer Stoker testified that after the arrest he and 
several other law enforcement officers went back to the freeway 
to search for the items he had seen thrown by the Appellant(R., 
p# 343, LI. 1-11). He did not ever find the first item that he 
saw the Appellant throw. (R. , p. 369, LI. 7-9). He did find 
several pieces of hypodermic syringes (R., p. 343, LI. 19-24), 
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and later found a small plastic bag with a white powdery 
substance inside of it (R., p. 346, LI. 2-10). 
Jon Gerlitz from the State Crime Lab, in his testimony, 
identified the substance in the plastic bag as being 26.3 grams 
of methamphetamine (R, p. 451, LI. 10-12). 
Testimony was received from Officer Staley that 1-15, 
between the Nevada border and 1-70 (north of St. George) is a 
major drug corridor, with drugs coming traveling on 1-15 from 
"everywhere" {R., p. 531, 1. 6 - p. 532, 1. 8). The question 
here is whether there was sufficient evidence presented to the 
jury to reasonably tie in the drugs found with the Appellant. 
The officer saw two items being thrown; one, what the officer 
thought was a handgun, was never recovered [R., p. 385, LI. 2-3). 
Near the point on 1-15 where the officer saw the Appellant throw 
a baggie, he found a bag with syringes and plungers (R., p. 376, 
LI. 12-17). Officer Stoker only testified to seeing two items 
thrown from the motorcycle during the pursuit, and one was not 
described as a baggie. The baggie found by Officer Stoker which 
contained the large quantity of methamphetamine was not in the 
same area where he saw items thrown; in fact, it was on the other 
side of the highway (R., p. 382, LI. 8-17). 
The standard used by the Utah Supreme Court for 
determining sufficiency of the evidence is "to require that it be 
so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
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could not reasonably believe defendant had committed a crime. 
Unless there is a clear showing of lack of evidence, the jury 
verdict will be upheld." State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 
1976)(footnotes omitted). While that is a high burden, Appellant 
believes that it is met here. Not only is the baggie in an area 
different from where the officer believed the baggie was thrown, 
but that area of 1-15 was known by law enforcement as a major 
drug corridor, with literally hundreds of other vehicles that 
could have left the baggie with the methamphetamine in it. The 
lack of evidence tying this baggie to the Appellant leaves the 
sufficiency of the evidence given to the jury in doubt, and their 
verdict as well. 
POINT VI: DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING APPELLANT/DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES? 
The Appellant was found guilty of all counts by the jury 
(R., p. 759, 1. 10 - p. 760, 1. 9). The Appellant chose to waive 
the time for sentencing (R. , p. 762, LI. 20-24), and the Court 
sentenced the Appellant to two consecutive terms of imprisonment 
of not less than one year and not more than fifteen years. The 
Appellant was also sentenced to serve two concurrent zero to five 
year terms and two concurrent County jail terms of six months 
with the balance of the two six month terms being suspended (R., 
p. 769, 1. 20-p. 772, 1. 10). The Court did so without a 
presentence report or any other objective information regarding 
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the Appellant's history, character and rehabilitative needs, 
Utah Code Annotated §76-3-401 reads, in relevant portion, as 
follows: 
(1) A Court shall determine, if a defendant has been 
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, 
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state 
offenses shall run concurrently unless the Court 
states in the sentence that they shall run 
consecutively. 
* * * * * 
(3) A court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant 
in determining whether to impose consecutive 
sentences. 
Clearly, first, is a presumption of concurrent sentences in §76-
3-401(1). Consecutive sentences, per subsection (3), shall 
consider several factors, not the least of which are "the 
history, character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant" 
before imposing a consecutive sentence. 
This statute has been reviewed previously. In State v. 
Lee, 656 P.2d 443 (Utah 1982), Lee was contesting his committment 
to consecutive sentences, similarly questioning whether the judge 
complied with subsection (3). While the Utah Supreme Court there 
found that the judge's sentence was justified, it also referred 
to a presentence report that was prepared in that case to justify 
its decision. Lee, supra at 444. In State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1993), while there is no mention of a presentence report 
having been prepared, the Court does discuss the fact that Deli 
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had previously been incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, and 
that he was a fugitive from justice when the underlying crimes 
were committed, Id at 435, suggesting information available to 
the trial court commonly obtained through a presentence report. 
In the instant case, the Trial Court noted its lack of 
information at the time of sentencing: 
As you well know, the matters before the Court are 
serious. Each of them carry 1 to 15 years incarceration 
in the Utah State Prison, and that is by legislative 
determination. Without further information, with only 
the bold recordof the facts and circumstances that I have 
heard during trial, I am given little, if any 
opportunity, to more carefully review this matter. 
R., p. 763, LI. 4-11, emphasis added. 
The Court then later remarked: 
I may not have the ability to do much other than to 
impose the sentence. If you wish me to do so, and it is 
my job and my duty I will do that if it is your request, 
but I would be remiss if I told you that I would not also 
benefit from a presentence report. 
R., p. 763, 1. 22 - p. 764, 1. 2. 
The Appellant did briefly address the Court (R., p. 765, 
1. 16 - p. 766, 1. 17). The prosecutor then addressed the Court 
and recommended consecutive sentences, based on Appellant' having 
previously been incarcerated in California and Appellant's 
criminal history (R. , p. 766, 1. 20 - p. 767, 1. 6), although 
there was no depth in discussing either the incarceration or the 
criminal history. Appellant then addressed the Court in 
rebuttal, and discussed briefly his past and his ability to be 
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rehabilitated (R. , p. 767, 1. 16 - p. 769, 1. 3). The Court then 
proceeded to have the sentence on counts I and II run consecutive 
[R. , p. 770, LI. 22-25). 
While there was discussion of the Defendant's history, 
character and rehabilitative needs, none of the information given 
to the judge was by disinterested parties. Prior to imposing 
consecutive sentences, the judge should have insisted on a 
presentence report, or not sentenced Appellant to consecutive 
sentences. Hence, Appellant requests this Court to vacate his 
current sentence and remand this matter back to trial court for 
sentencing in accordance with §76-3-401(3). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant requests that this 
Court find that the conviction of Appellant was in error, and 
that the conviction be reversed, with a remand to the trial court 
for a new trial. In the alternative, Appellant requests that the 
sentence imposed be vacated, and the case be remanded to the 
trial court to determine what an appropriate sentence should be 
for the Appellant. 
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ADDENDUM 
Attached hereto is a copy of the transcript of the 
videotape regarding Appellant's Motion to Compel, which was heard 
on September 27, 1995. The Court Reporter filed the original of 
this transcript with the District Court rather than with the 
Court of Appeals, and the original had not yet made it to the 
Court's Record at the time of the writing of Appellant's Brief. 
Hence, Appellant provides a copy of the transcript as an 
Addendum. 
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant 
Case No. 960149-CA Page Number 33 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING 
Registered Professional Reporters 
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District Coucf Clerk, Wash. County 
220 North i00 East 
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RE: State of Utah vs. Kenneth D. Souza 
Case 951500570/Washington County 
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Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
J. Elizabeth Van Fleet 
RPR, CSR 
evf 
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ST. GEORGE, WASH., CO., UT., WED., SEPT. 27, 1995 
-oOo-
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Item 41 on the calendar, 
951500570, State of Utah versus Kenneth Duane 
Souza. Mr. Souza is present, together with his 
counsel, Mr. Scarth. Mr. Scarth, Mr. Souza you 
claim is indigent, and you need transcripts and an 
investigator. Is that what you're looking for as 
well as a motion to compel discovery? 
MR. SCARTH: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll hear you with 
respect, first, to indigency. 
MR. SCARTH: Okay. And -- those two 
items, and then at the end I'll request the 
opportunity to address the bail situation. So some 
of my remarks will apply to the request for 
appointment of an investigator, transcripts. Some 
will apply to bail, but they -- they're -- I think 
they're all applicable to those two. 
Your Honor, Mr. Souza has been in jail 
since the 2nd of July. In this case he has bail set 
at 50,000 cash only. There was another insubsequent 
case wherein bail was set at 10,000 cash only, but 
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Court revoked his bail, which had been posted by 
Beehive Bail 
$15,000. 
Bonding, in the form of a bond, 
Since he's been incarcerated, his 






I'll give a 
. I have an exhibit 
copy to counsel. 
reason of that 
is that Mr. SOU2 
mother 
in that 
is relevant, Your 
:a has a 14-year -old 
daughter and he has the care, custody, and control 
of her, and she's been with his mother in Myton, 
Utah since February of 1994. And her mother -- his 
mother is now unable to financially support Mr. 
Souza's daughter. 
What I'm leading up to, Your Honor, is 
since he's been incarcerated since July 2nd he's 
been unemployed, been and unable to meet any of 
those obligations. He has extinguished his assets 
as a result of lawyer fees, and there's just nothing 
left. 
His mother is scheduled for open-heart 
surgery. He needs to be out working, and so if the 
Court does grant the motion it may be on -- the 
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motion for transcripts and funds for an 
investigator, it may be on a temporary basis. If 
the Court would review it later, it might find that 
he's employed and no longer entitled to those 
items. But as I say I'm also addressing the bail 
question. 
He has located employment in Myton. He 
needs to be there living with his mother and 
daughter. He would work for American Towing, which 
is owned by Robert Essex in Myton. He has -- Mr. 
Souza has worked there before. In fact, he sold 
that business to Robert Essex. The defendant, as I 
probably already mentioned, plans to live in Myton 
with his mother and daughter. 
THE COURT: When is the surgery scheduled, 
counsel? 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm not sure, Your Honor. 
I talked to my mother last night. Her doctor has 
scheduled it. (Inaudible.) I didn't ask for a 
date. It's soon, though. She has had one bypass --
triple bypass this year, and she's having heart 
failure again. And not only she's not financially 
able to support my daughter, physically she's -- and 
I've raised her since she's four years old. She's a 
straight "A" student. She's a good girl. And by me 
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not being there, she's somewhat getting herself in a 
little bit of trouble because my mother is not able 
to supervise her. 
MR. SCARTH: Also his mother is being 
evicted. She's without funds. The child, of 
course, needs school clothing and other things. 
But in connection with the motion for 
transcript and investigator, I have talked with an 
investigator, that's Mr. Jack Lasswell of St. 
George, Utah. He's present in the courtroom. He's 
prepared to state to the Court or testify to the 
Court as to his fees. 
What we would need to be investigated is 
that my client advises that he recognized the 
occupants of other vehicles during the alleged high 
speed chase. We need to have them investigated. We 
need some photographs taken. So it's --
THE COURT: Have you got a ceiling on it, 
counsel? Can I authorize up to a given dollar 
figure? 
MR. SCARTH: Yeah. For now, I think a 
thousand dollars would be -- would cover it, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SCARTH: On transcripts, we need a 
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transcript of the preliminary hearing in this case. 
I reserve the right to file motions that would 
normally be filed at arraignment time. I intend to 
file a motion for quash and remand. I need a 
transcript for that purpose. 
I think I've already mentioned it on the 
bail issue. Well, let me address that a little more 
specifically. The statute, which is Section 
77-20-1, and I'll hand a copy to the Court and 
counsel. 
THE COURT: I have it hear, counsel, if I 
need to look at it. 
MR. SCARTH: All right. I'll hand one to 
counsel. Provides as follows: A person charged 
with, arrested for a criminal offense shall be 
admitted to bail as a matter of right except if the 
person is charged with (A) and then subparagraph (B) 
felony while on probation or parole or while free on 
bail awaiting trial on a previous felony charge when 
there is substantial evidence to support the current 
charge, or, felony, when there is substantial 
evidence to support the charge and the Court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other 
person or to the community or is likely to flee 
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jurisdiction'-- the jurisdiction of the Court if 
released on bail. 
Mr. Souza has had business in this court 
prior to these two recent arrests. To my knowledge, 
he's never failed to appear so the flight risk isn't 
a problem. There's been no evidence presented or 
was no evidence presented when the Court revoked 
bail and set it at 50,000 cash only, that there was, 
under subparagraph B, substantial evidence to 
support that charge or the one in Kane County. 
There was no substantial evidence 
presented, and I doubt that there will be any 
presented today, by a clear and convincing standard 
that this person would constitute a substantial 
danger to any other person or to the community. So 
I have those two matters. I'll address the motion 
to compel now or -- (inaudible.) 
THE COURT: Go ahead. Let's hear your 
motion to compel. 
MR. SCARTH: On the motion to compel, I 
also have some exhibits, Your Honor. I'll hand 
copies to counsel. Your Honor, early in the stages 
of this case I filed more or less a routine motion 
to discover. Thereafter, on August 1, 1995, I sent 
a letter --an informal letter to Mr. Ludlow 
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requesting a document as discovery, that document 
being the St. George City Police Department's 
portion of their policies and procedures that apply 
to fresh pursuit. 
Mr. Ludlow made, I believe, reasonable 
efforts to produce that but then had to advise me 
that the Chief of Police would not turn that 
document over to him for copying and supply me with 
a copy at which point I filed, under the GRAMMA Act 
in Utah, a records request of the City of St. George 
requesting that item. 
Thereafter, as you'll see from the 
exhibit, I got a notice of denial. Why do we need 
that document? We need that document, Your Honor, 
because the police reports indicate that during the 
alleged hot pursuit or fresh pursuit that the 
patrolling officer traveled up to speeds of 115 
miles per hour. 
I believe that I may find in those 
policies that that's a violation of St. George City 
Police's policies, and if it is, that would go to 
the credibility of the officer, and it would also 
lead me into an area of if he would violate that 
policy or that procedure, would he violate others in 
this investigation and arrest. I'll submit it. 
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THE COURT: All right. Counsel, with 
respect to your discovery motion, your request is 
denied. The Court looks at the matter and 
determines it as follows: The existence of a speed 
limit cap on a fresh or hot pursuit policy of the 
St. George City Police Department, and whether or 
not such a cap was exceeded by the pursuing officer 
in this matter -- and I take specific notice that I 
was the judge who heard the preliminary hearing in 
this matter and listened to the testimony carefully 
and have that testimony clearly in mind at this time 
-- the Court's determination is that whether or not 
that officer at the time either intentionally or 
inadvertently determined to violate that cap is 
wholly and entirely collateral to the issues of this 
case. 
I do not find that there is a significant 
connection for relevance terms between that policy 
and the actions of the officer and the credibility 
of the officer under this case under the 
circumstances that the officer was, in fact, in hot 
pursuit behind a vehicle that was not responding to 
his signal to stop, that the officer observed items 
being thrown from that vehicle and testified as 
such, and I see no causal connection. Based upon 
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that, I deny your discovery motion. Mr. Scarth, you 
have got your record. Do you need any further 
delineation on that? 
MR. SCARTH: No. I think you have given 
your grounds, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, with respect 
to the determination of indigency, Mr. Ludlow, 
what's the State's position on that? 
MR. LUDLOW: Your Honor, the State 
believes that Mr. Souza has retained counsel, some 
of the things he's asking for I believe that Mr. 
Scarth can provide as part of his representation. 
We would also like the Court to inquire into Mr. 
Souza's indigency status by going through a hearing 
to determine that. 
THE COURT: I would ordinarily swear Mr. 
Souza at this time, counsel, to make that 
determination. 
MR. SCARTH: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Mr. Souza, would you, again, 
as best you can, raise your right hand and take an 
oath. 
(Whereupon, Kenneth Duane Souza 
was sworn by the judge.) 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have a job, 
'VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING (801) 652-9971 




THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: You have been incarcerated 
since July the 2nd of 1995, and that's accurate, 
sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: That's correct. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have any 
personal property by way of motor vehicles, bank 
accounts, furnitures, fixtures, anything not subject 
to -- not exempt from execution worth more than 
$500? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, yes and no. If Mr. 
Ludlow would return some of my stuff --
THE COURT: Well, if it is in police 
custody, it is probably not --
THE DEFENDANT: I don't have nothing. 
THE COURT: -- to be counted. 
THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely nothing. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you own any 
land or real estate anywhere, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I do not. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ludlow, any 
areas of inquiry you think we ought to cover? 
MR. LUDLOW: No, I believe that covers it, 
Your Honor. 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING (801) 6 52-9971 
P.O. Box 2702, St. George, Utah 84771-2702 
12 
951500570 9-27-95 
1 THE COURT: Mr. Souza, I find that you are 
2 in deed indigent. Accordingly, the cost of 
3 transcripts will be paid for by Washington County. 
4 MR. LUDLOW: Your Honor, before the Court 
5 makes that determination, I received a letter from 
6 Mr. Souza, and if I could have the bailiff -- this 
7 indicates he has a motor vehicle that's valued at 
8 $5,000 that does not a have a lien on it, 
9 lienholder's or any claim. St. George Police does 
10 have that vehicle in impound right now. 
11 I think that -- that perhaps, well, with 
12 an order of the Court, we could sell that vehicle or 
13 do whatever and that would provide for the things 
14 that he's asking for, transcripts, investigator 
15 fees, whatever. I believe he does have $5,000 here 
16 as what he is claiming the value of that motor 
17 vehicle. 
18 THE COURT: What is the authority of the 
19 police department to hold this asset, counsel? 
2 0 MR. LUDLOW: Your Honor, we have had that 
21 vehicle. Mr. Souza claims that that is his 
22 vehicle. He's never provided any documentation. 
23 There's another gentleman who also claims ownership 
24 to that vehicle. So the position of St. George 
25 Police Department and the City Attorney's Office, 
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1 until they receive documentation as to whose vehicle 
2 that is, they don't want to release it to anyone. 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, if I may say 
4 something, please. 
5 THE COURT: No. Counsel, my concern is 
6 Mr. Souza is now in custody. He is facing a most k 
7 serious felony charge, and if there are resources 
8 here that can be used, if he's got a claim to the 
9 vehicle, I don't think this is the appropriate forum 
10 in which to adjudicate title of that vehicle. I 
11 don't even know who the other person is. 
12 I'm going to determine that if St. George 
13 City is holding onto it, for reasons known only to 
14 themselves, Mr. Souza certainly doesn't have access 
15 to it. Whether he does or doesn't have title, I 
16 can't determine at this point. 
17 The Court's order is that he'll have 
18 transcripts. I will authorize payment of $500 for 
19 investigator expense, and if that is not enough, Mr. 
20 Scarth, come back to the Court and we'll see where 
21 we are there. 
22 MR. SCARTH: Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Scarth? 
24 You want to submit the bail issue? 
25 MR. SCARTH: Yes. As to bail, Your Honor, 
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1 I would request the Court to reinstate Beehive Bail 
2 Bonding $15,000 bond, and I've stated my reasons. 
3 The main reasons revolves around his mother and his 
4 daughter and their need to have him with them and to 
5 have him out working to provide for them. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Counsel, I take 
7 that well in mind, and I am more than slightly 
8 troubled by Mr. Souza's mother's physical condition 
9 and her inability to care for a 14-year-old child. 
10 But this Court found by not only probable cause, but 
11 I will put it on the record now, from the 
12 preliminary hearing, this Court found clear and 
13 convincing evidence, that it was described to this 
14 Court as a fist-sized rock of methamphetamine was 
15 recovered in the investigation of this case. 
16 Methamphetamine is, in fact, responsible 
17 for the majority of the criminal cases -- active 
18 criminal cases on this Court's docket at the present 
19 time. Those who possess such quantities are a clear 
2 0 and present danger to this community. By clear and 
21 convincing evidence, Mr. Souza falls into that 
22 category. Your bail request is denied. 
23 MR. LUDLOW: Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 MR. SCARTH: Your Honor, it's presently 
25 set at 50,000 cash only. Could that be cash or 
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THE COURT: Cash only is the order, 
MR. LUDLOW: Thank you, Your Honor, 
(Thereupon, the proceedings 
were concluded.) 
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